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The Department of Defense (DoD) launched in 1997/98 an
ambitious planning initiative that could have a major impact
upon how resources are allocated among the military
departments and the combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs).
The National Command Authorities have directed the
geographic CINCs to implement the administration’s strategy of
“shaping” within their areas of responsibility. In the past, no
single, unifying planning mechanism existed within the Joint
Strategic Planning System to address shaping. As a result, the
DoD  now seeks to ensure that all shaping activities conducted by
the U.S. armed forces are executed to further U.S. policy and
national security objectives.
The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) system has been in
existence for almost 4 years. From its early problematic initiation
and the reluctance of many in the DoD and the armed forces to
take it seriously, the TEP has become a major agenda item
particularly for the geographic CINCs. Many in the combatant
commands see the TEP as providing an important instrument
that strengthens their respective positions in the never ending
struggle to obtain the forces and capabilities needed to implement 
theater strategies. Therefore, the TEP must be consistent with
military department Title 10 responsibilities to raise, train and
equip the U.S. armed forces.
The authors of this study assess the TEP with the view of
analyzing how to make the planning system better. The Strategic
Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study for the
consideration of the national defense community, particularly
those who have an interest in the joint strategic planning of the
Department of Defense.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute 
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ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S
THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROCESS
Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting
democracy, opening markets, and containing disease and
hunger brings a sure return in security and long-term
savings.1
The Department of Defense (DoD) has launched a new
and ambitious planning initiative that could have a major
impact upon how resources are allocated among the armed
services and the combatant commands. The administration
has directed the geographic combatant commanders-
in-chief (CINCs) to implement the administration’s
strategy of “shape, respond and prepare now.” 2 Of course,
DoD, the Military Departments, and constituent agencies
have long been accustomed to “preparing” for potential
conflicts so that the U.S. armed forces could “respond” when
directed by the national command authorities (NCA).
“Shaping,” however, has been a bit more problematic. A very 
strong argument could be made that the U.S. armed
services have long been engaged in shaping activities in the
international environment. From U.S. Marines all but
occupying and governing Caribbean and Central American
countries in the early part of this century, to U.S.
servicemen and women engaged in peace-enforcement
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, many past and
present U.S. operations can be categorized as shaping
activities.3
What is perhaps new is how these activities are to be
planned and managed within DoD. 4 First, the fog of
strategic ambiguity that followed the Cold War has
dissipated sufficiently for the administration to
contemplate taking advantage of what Secretary of Defense
Cohen calls a period of “. . . strategic opportunity.”
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The threat of global war has receded and the nation’s core
values of representative democracy and market economics are
embraced in many parts of the world, creating new
opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced
cooperation among nations.5
In other words, “shaping” seeks to promote the spread of
“Western” liberal norms (e.g., representative democracy,
respect for basic human rights, adherence to the rule of law,
etc.), with the primary objective of obviating the need to
“respond” to future crises. 6 There should be no question of
the growing import of “shaping” from the perspective of
DoD; of the two critical corporate goals of the department as
required by the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993, “shaping” constitutes the first. 7
The mission of shaping is to be conducted within the
framework of the administration’s strategy of
“engagement,” which states, “[W]e must be prepared and
willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power
to influence the actions of other states and non-state
actors.”8 The administration rejects isolationism, let alone
adopting a reactive, passive approach toward its
relationship with the world. 9 On the contrary, the world will
be engaged and the adoption of Western ideals and norms
will be advocated to further U.S. national interests. Shaping 
the international environment has become, in essence, a
primary national objective, as opposed to, perhaps, an
important instrument of policy.
Second, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
playing a more direct role in the “planning” of shaping, 10
DoD envisages that “shaping” will achieve greater resource
efficiencies and more direct strategic relevance. DoD also
has the objective of ensuring that all shaping activities
conducted by the U.S. armed forces are executed within the
parameters of law11 and policy.12 In this particular aspect of
implementing the president’s strategy, DoD faces difficult
challenges and opportunities. In the past, no single, unified
planning mechanism within the Joint Strategic Planning
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System (JSPS) addressed the issue of “shaping.” This
situation stands in contrast to the elaborate,
well-developed, and time-tested planning methodology the
Joint Staff (acting on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)), employs in directing the geographic
combatant commanders-in-chief to develop deliberate war
plans. 1 3 In effect, the Joint Staff and combatant
commanders are now asserting greater influence and
control over the shaping activities that the armed forces
have been carrying out for many years.
The method designed by the CJCS to bring discipline
and central control to these diffuse activities is the recently
introduced “Theater Engagement Planning” process. The
five geographic combatant CINCs and the Joint Staff
(acting as an Executive Agent for two Theater Engagement
Plans [TEPs]) have been tasked by the CJCS to develop
TEPs which express their “. . . intent, priorities, tasks and
resources required to achieve objectives over the [Future
Year Defense Program].” 14
Heretofore geographic combatant CINCs individually
employed their assigned forces for shaping activities
without discernible corporate consideration of relative costs
and global priorities. Furthermore, these commanders have 
been primarily concerned with executing operations and
conducting deliberate planning and the key resource
allocation battles have traditionally been fought among the
Services. The TEP process could provide the combatant
CINCs a stronger opportunity to influence this politically
sensitive debate. Moreover, given the criticality of shaping
missions, combatant commanders may now have a new
objective mechanism to compete for resources. The
implications for the assignment of roles and definition of
missions among the various components of the U.S. armed
services are staggering.
The purpose of this essay is to assess the TEP system in
order to identify problems and recommend reforms to
improve the overall process. The authors argue that
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although the TEP program is an important step in the right
direction, it has a number of weaknesses that need to be
eliminated if DoD is to gain better control over, and provide
direction to, shaping activities. At the same time, a
reformed “TEP” process could replace certain atavistic Cold
War planning practices with those suited to the current
international environment. In view of the potential for such
far-reaching implications, it is in the best interests of the
U.S. Government and DoD that the TEP process be refined
as quickly as possible.
Background.
The National Military Strategy defines shaping in the
following way:
U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment
primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and
through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element
of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international
relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment
by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and
threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.15
And indeed, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. armed forces have been involved in shaping the
international security environment. Partnership for Peace
(PfP) exercises and exchanges, International Military
Education and Training, mobile education team seminars
under the Expanded International Military Education and
Training program, in addition to the “Enhanced Relations”
programs and activities which have been undertaken by
U.S. Army Pacific since the mid-1970s, are but a very few of
the types of missions in which the armed services are now
engaged.16 More to the point, “shaping” is not a partisan
issue or ephemeral policy. The National Defense Panel, a
bipartisan body hardly known for shying away from
criticizing the administration’s defense policy, strongly
endorsed the concept of shaping. 17 “Done well, [shaping] will 
enable the United States and its allies to influence and
4
shape future security environments to our mutual
benefit.”18 
What has been missing in these engagement programs is 
an effective and coherent national-level method of
orchestrating and effecting a priority of these activities
above the level of individual geographic combatant
commander’s regional focus. To be sure, there are
inter-agency processes in Washington for coordinating and
approving various shaping activities, funded by the
Services, and executed under the command authority of the
geographic combatant CINCs. Until the CJCS and
combatant CINCs implemented the TEP process, however,
there was no mechanism for an individual, let alone
collective, assessment of the efficacy of these activities. In
other words, there have been no centralized means of
examining whether, or to what extent, the various
CINC-conducted shaping activities supported the national
strategy of engagement. There have been no accepted
standard measures of effectiveness or merit. While there
are a number of avenues that combatant commanders have
to influence the program objective memoranda (POMs) of
the military departments, there are no specific means to
rationalize the provision of forces for CINCs’ engagement
programs to ensure the most effective and efficient
employment of defense resources by the combatant CINCs.
The release of the president’s 1997 National Security
Strategy marked a significant change from the 1995 edition
in that the 1995 strategy of “engagement” was given greater
fidelity and direction in 1997 through “shaping.” The 1997
document establishes the need to “shape, respond, prepare
now” which was strongly reflected in the administration’s
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 19 These forces brought 
to the fore in DoD the need for a disciplined approach to
planning and executing shaping missions. A major obstacle
to overcome was the issue of whether, and how, the CJCS
should become involved in a process traditionally left
largely to the discretion of the combatant CINCs. Any
attempt to provide oversight over the shaping activities of
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the CINCs clashes with a widely held institutional view that 
the geographic combatant CINCs know best their
respective areas of responsibility and should be left alone to
carry out their missions. After all, as stipulated in Title 10,
the geographic CINCs (vice the Joint Staff) carry out
deliberate planning in their areas of responsibility (AORs)
in accordance with direction from the Chairman contained
in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 20 The plans
developed by the CINCs are individually reviewed and
approved by the CJCS.21 
The reluctance by CINCs’ staffs to expand the planning
system to provide the Chairman with a means to influence
shaping missions was overcome by the Chairman and the
Director of the Joint Staff whose personal involvement
expedited the acceptance of the TEP concept. Subsequently,
planners from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff developed planning guidance to incorporate DoD 
shaping missions. This important reform initiative was
formalized by the revision of the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS) in September 1997. The new CJCS
Instruction stated that the JSCP would task CINCs to
develop, inter alia, “theater engagement plans (TEP) for
peacetime engagement.” The NCA, via the Contingency
Planning Guidance document, will direct the Chairman to
specify which types of engagement and shaping activities
will be carried out by the U.S. armed forces. 22
The Theater Engagement Planning Process.
Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG is
required by law to be promulgated annually and is a
close-hold, highly classified document with limited
circulation.23 The CPG contains contingency planning
guidance from the NCA that is directly translated by the
Chairman into the JSCP’s taskings to the CINCs. Following 
the QDR and as part of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s keen interest in seeing a more disciplined method
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of managing shaping missions, TEP guidance was
established in the September 1997 CPG: 24
1. Directed the development of regional CINC TEPs . . .
to include the full range of engagement activities . . .
2. Defined “Theater Engagement.”
3. Directed that TEPs be based on Prioritized Regional
Objectives.
4. Established a submission, review and approval
process.25
The appended “Prioritized Regional Objectives” were to
be pursued by the geographic combatant commanders 26 and
are articulated in the following priority:
Tier I: shaping activities to be carried out;
Tier II: shaping activities to be carried out to the extent
possible; and,
Tier III: shaping activities to be carried out as resources
permit.
A major weakness in the Prioritized Regional Objectives
in the 1997 CPG is the absence of stated priorities across
theaters or regions, or even within tiered objectives. One
combatant command planner criticized the Prioritized
Regional Objectives stating that they are far too detailed
(i.e., they are, in effect, “tasks,” vice objectives). Moreover,
priorities among the combatant commands have yet to be
established. A slight, but significant, nuance in the
transmission of this guidance is that Prioritized Regional
Objectives are established in the CPG by regions, vice being
aligned with the Unified Command Plan’s (UCP) division of
geographic areas of responsibilities for the geographic
combatant commanders to facilitate their contingency
planning.27 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). As part of the
deliberate planning process the JSCP provides guidance
and apportions resources to the regional combatant
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commanders. With the guidance and requirements
provided by the CPG, the Chairman subsequently tasks the
combatant CINCs, through the JSCP, to prepare their
respective operation plans, e.g., contingency plans, 28 or in
some cases, functional plans. 29 The revisions initiated by the 
TEP process led to the current JSCP including a chapter
(Enclosure E, Engagement Planning Guidance) which
transmits the Prioritized Regional Objectives from the
CPG. Initial guidance in the JSCP for TEP directed the
CINCs to shape the security environment in peacetime with 
the following objectives:
1. Access, interoperability, regional stability,
2. Strengthen coalitions, and
3. Facilitate the ability to respond. 30
This revision, in effect, gives the JSCP a dual role: It is
now an operational document, as well as a deliberate
planning tool.31 The JSCP’s Prioritized Regional Objectives
are given in the following order of import:
Tier I: vital
Tier II: important
Tier III: lesser important32
The JSCP further reflects three categories of TEP events 




3. other foreign military interaction (FMI), e.g., ship
visits, military-to-military contacts, International Military
Education and Training, etc. 33
With this guidance the CINCs are expected to produce
two additional planning documents.
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First, the CINCs and Executive Agents 34 must develop a
Theater Engagement Strategic Concept. This is defined as
containing,
. . . a narrative statement of how engagement activities will be
employed to support achieving the CINC’s or executive
Agent’s objectives. [It] becomes the foundation of the TEP and
includes the commander’s intent; prioritized objectives; and a
general discussion of the engagement tasks and activities.
Additionally, it identifies at the macro-level the forces and
other resources required to accomplish the mission.35
Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts look out 5 years
and remain effective until updated or superceded by
regional developments or prioritized regional objectives are
changed in the CPG or the JSCP. The initial strategic
concepts were due to the Joint Staff on April 1, 1998. 36
Second, CINCs and Executive Agents develop
Engagement Activity Annexes to their Theater Engage-
ment Strategic Concepts. These annexes, all of which
support the CINC’s strategic concept, address the specific
military activities (operations, exercises, and foreign
military interaction) that will take place each year of the 5
years covered by the TEP. The JSCP does not assign forces
specifically for shaping. Rather, as a starting point,
combatant CINCs plan their shaping activities using forces
assigned to the combatant command (from the “Forces For”
document), forces that rotationally deploy to the theater,
and those forces temporarily deployed for engagement
activities. 37 Any significant resource shortfalls are
identified and theoretically adjudicated in the TEP review
process.38 The CINCs submitted the initial Engagement
Activity Annexes (designated as a “trial run” by the Joint
Staff) to the Joint Staff on August 1, 1998.
National Level Review of TEPs. After CINCs have
approved their TEPs, they are forwarded to the Joint Staff
for “review” and integration.39 The Chairman is responsible
for ensuring that TEPs conform to the CPG’s policy
guidance. In this review capacity he is responsible for
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informing the NCA of strengths and deficiencies in these
plans and judging the impact such inadequacies could have
on achieving national strategic objectives and policies. 40 The 
Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability
Directorate (J-7), specifically the Conventional War Plans
Division, is charged with overseeing the TEP review
process.41 The process affords review by the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Services, and
Defense Agencies, as well. The criteria for review assesses
whether strategic concepts and supporting annexes support 
the JSCP regional objective priorities, as well as additional
guidance derived from other national-level documents.
Specifically, the review process uses three criteria:
1. adequacy (does the plan satisfy JSCP tasks and other
guidance?),
2. feasibility (is resource availability adequate to
requirements?), and
3. acceptability (is the plan worth the cost?). 42
If the review finds any deficiencies, the responsible
command will be required to address these issues and
perhaps make changes. Once the TEPs have been reviewed,
they are integrated into a “global family of plans” and
submitted as a whole to the Chairman for his approval, and
thereafter, for further review by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.43
Assessing the TEP Process.
As a general observation one must not be too critical of
DoD’s effort to introduce a disciplined planning system to
shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces. The
TEP initiative attempts to exert control over diffuse and
long-standing defense activities and programs.
Significantly, these activities and programs were
established by various pieces of key legislation and
administered widely throughout the U.S. defense
community. Given the importance the administration has
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placed on shaping the international environment through
engagement, the rapid introduction of the TEP process
should be seen as a significant advancement in planning. In
light of instituting a new process within DoD, the initial
planning guidance was envisaged as a first effort in an
evolutionary process. In view of the novel nature of this
planning process, however, a number of procedural and
conceptual problems have surfaced.
There are two levels of analysis when assessing the TEP. 
First, does the current system, as designed, work? Second,
does the current TEP system feature the necessary linkages 
to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS)44 and the Joint Strategic Planning System? The
authors argue that not only does the current TEP system
possess what can fairly be described as shortcomings, but
the system, as it now exists, is unlikely to introduce the
necessary discipline effectively and efficiently to execute the 
shaping element of the president’s strategy. More
specifically, an examination of the TEP system indicates
that many of its key features are not yet in harmony with
the JSPS and PPBS and, therefore, sub-optimally respond
to the direction provided by the NCA. This section identifies
where specific shortcomings in the existing TEP process
exists and recommends reforms to the TEP and JSPS
processes. If implemented, these improvements should
enable the process to support better a strategy for shaping
the international security environment, while ensuring
U.S. forces remain capable of responding to challenges to
U.S. national interests.
1. Measuring merit/effectiveness. An essential aspect of
strategic planning is the requirement for senior leaders to
establish priorities and develop a mechanism to monitor
compliance with their guidance. The current TEP process
fails to define or to examine what constitutes effective
shaping activities. While the system is well structured to
inform the Joint Staff what the geographic combatant
CINCs and their Executive Agents are doing, it is currently
incapable of demonstrating how effectively they are
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carrying out these activities. The TEP process, as currently
designed, does not set forth an appropriate “measure of
merit/effectiveness.” This major oversight inhibits the
Chairman’s ability to assess which “activities” conducted by
a geographic CINC are more or less effective than others.
For example, a combatant CINC can claim that “presence”
is a shaping activity, but he is not asked in the process to
demonstrate how this is an effective tool of “engagement.”
The lack of a standardized, across-combatant command
system to measure the merit/effectiveness of shaping
activities conducted within combatant commands negates
any attempt to assess all of the TEPs, individually and
collectively.  If priorities within regions were established, an 
absence of measures of merit/effectiveness precludes
efficient application of scarce resources to accomplish
regional objectives. Even if inter-regional priorities were
established at the national level, it follows that the lack of
measures of merit/effectiveness prevents efficient
allocation of resources among regions or commands.
2. Title 10, United States Code Ambiguities. Closely
linked to the lack of measures of effectiveness is the
politically sensitive issue of Title 10 authority of the
Services that relates to the actual costs associated with the
shaping activities conducted by the CINCs. While Title 10,
U.S. Code designates that combatant CINCs possess
“combatant command” over their assigned forces, CINCs
possess little budgetary control over forces provided by the
Services. Financial control remains predominantly within
the grasp of the Military Departments. Such control is
established by Title 10 Service functions that include the
responsibilities to “raise, train, and equip” the force. The
Services continue to guard their Title 10 authorities against
encroachment by the combatant commanders.
As a result of this legal and bureaucratic history,
combatant command headquarters are not in a good
position to ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency of
shaping activities. Even the Services are not well-prepared
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to provide this type of detailed information because shaping
activities are not segregated in Service Program Objective
Memoranda (POMs). In short, TEP planning and execution
conducted by the combatant CINCs, and the activities of the
Services in providing TEP forces, are not harmonized to
ensure effective and efficient shaping activities. Therefore,
TEP activities cannot be assessed, even on a discrete
command or Service basis. While addressing this problem
could result in visceral reactions by the Services to such
scrutiny and resistance by the combatant CINCs to such
oversight, an essential aspect behind the development of
TEP, i.e., the ability to judge overall effectiveness of
engagement activities, will be unattainable otherwise.
3. Future Years Defense Program. An early problematic
issue concerning TEP was its incompatibility with the
important Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), the process by which DoD translates military
capability requirements into defense programs and budget
items. As initially structured, the submission of the
Engagement Activity Annexes was not aligned with the
POM development process. The TEP process was initially
planned to cover the immediately succeeding 5 years, while
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) covers the period 2-8 
years from the present. This programmatic mismatch
further isolated engagement activities from being
considered in the Services’ development of force
requirements. The top-down guidance provided in the
engagement planning process is in the form of the CPG’s
Prioritized Regional Objectives, whereas the budgetary
authority to develop forces resides in the Services who build
their programs in a bottom-up fashion. Not surprisingly,
after the first “trial run” of the TEP, five of the six CINCs’
TEPs had unfunded activities. Also, the dates of the CINCs’
TEP submissions were not aligned with submission of their
Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), 45 further inhibiting TEP
from influencing the PPBS process.
In a move to improve this situation, the Director of the
Joint Staff effected several important reforms in February
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1999.46 First, TEP Strategic Concepts will be submitted
every other year (vice yearly as initially envisaged), except
in certain circumstances. 47 Second, Engagement Activity
Annexes will be submitted annually on October 1, in
harmony with the Integrated Priority List submissions by
the combatant CINCs. IPLs are employed by the combatant
commanders as a way to submit their force program
priorities through the CJCS to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. 48 Third and
finally, the reform extended the planning horizon from 5 to 7 
years, aligning the last 6 years of this planning period with
the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 49 as well as with the
Future Years Defense Program. Significantly, combatant
commanders will be able to identify force requirements for
shaping early enough to include them in their IPLs. 50
4. “Review” vice “Assessment” of TEPs. One will recall
that the current TEP system specifies that the CINCs’ plans 
are reviewed and presented for approval to the CJCS as a
part of a “globally-integrated family of engagement plans.” 51
Thus, the Joint Staff chose not to “review” TEPs against
each other.  In effect,  the lack of measures of
merit/effectiveness limits the review of the Joint Staff
simply to examining whether a particular commander’s
Theater Engagement Strategic Concept is supported by the
accompanying Engagement Activity Annexes. There is, as
yet, no step that assesses whether a specific TEP supports
national objectives. Where there are shortfalls, the lack of
comparable data at the strategic level inhibits the
Chairman from being able to make informed resource
decisions. Indeed, one can see where “have” CINCs (e.g.,
EUCOM) will wish to protect their peacetime allocated
forces by demonstrating their heavy involvement in
shaping, while “have not” CINCs (e.g., U.S. Southern
Command) may attempt to master the TEP process to
establish that their shaping requirements necessitate a
higher peacetime allocation of forces. Again, strategy,
disciplined planning, and priorities are likely to be left out of 
the decisionmaking equation. 
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At the heart of this particular weakness in the TEP
process is the decision to incorporate TEP directly into the
Chairman’s deliberate planning system. The review
criteria, one recalls, is essentially the same as that
employed when reviewing deliberate plans developed by the 
combatant commanders: (1) feasibility, (2) adequacy, and
(3) acceptability.52 Two fundamental problems result from
the decision to incorporate TEP into the deliberate planning 
system. One relates specifically to TEP and the other, much
broader than TEP, concerns the incomplete adherence by
the CJCS to statutory strategic planning requirements.
As to the first point, the decision to incorporate TEP into
the deliberate planning system reflects the Joint Staff’s
initial decision to view TEP similarly to conventional war
planning. The problem is that these plans, let alone
activities executed by the plans, are not at all similar to
typical war plans. Some examples of these differences are:
1. Unlike deliberate plans, TEPs are plans that are
presently and continually executed. A TEP more accurately
resembles the kinds of products that emerge from crisis
action planning where one sees the results of planning and
its relationship to outcomes.
2. Deliberate planning products address a specific
situation or contingency and describe a projected end-state,
while engagement is open-ended. A shaping end-state is
more like a vision than an objective. Moreover, TEP
successes and failures cannot be ascertained quickly (i.e.,
building “institutions” takes time).
3. Combatant CINCs do not completely control many of
the constituent elements in a TEP. 53
4. Risk assessment in the area of shaping is different
from risk assumptions and assessments applied in the
development of operation plans. 54
5. Deliberate planning is not focused on operation tempo
or force readiness. Units are apportioned for planning
purposes assuming that they will be ready at plan
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execution. Conversely, “shaping” activities are executed
and, therefore,  depend more directly  upon the readiness of
the forces assigned to these missions.
6. The assessment process in deliberate planning focuses 
on the application of military judgment within the
parameters of the defined situation that provides the basis
for the plan. TEP, on the other hand, involves the
expenditure of resources at some level of effort. Therefore
TEP must be assessed in view of the national and theater
strategy, NCA priorities and regional objectives.
Two points emerge from this review of TEP and the
Deliberate Planning System. First, while TEPs are
generally developed in conformity with the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format, they are
markedly different from deliberate plans. Second, given this 
finding, other than accomplishing a perfunctory oversight,
it makes little sense for the Joint Staff merely to  “review,"
vice assess them.55 Clearly, a full assessment is required if
DoD is to be able to make accurate and rational resource
decisions regarding shaping requirements.
5. Areas of Responsibility and the UCP. Current
planning guidance documents categorize Prioritized
Regional Objectives within regions; regions which do not
match with the assigned areas of responsibility of the
geographic combatant CINCs. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of State are organized along
regional lines which simply do not match up with UCP
defined areas of command responsibility. It is unreasonable
to assume, let alone argue, that CINC AORs, which are
subject to change, should be aligned with regional bureaux
in the Departments of State and Defense.
Another vexatious issue relates to shortcomings in the
UCP itself. Three countries key to U.S. national security;
Russia, Canada, and Mexico do not fall under the
responsibility of any geographic combatant commander. 56
Thus, the TEP for Russia is developed by the J-5 Division of
the Joint Staff, but executed by various combatant
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commanders and their component commands. 57 Mexico, for
TEP purposes, is assigned to U.S. Southern Command,
whereas the Canadian TEP is the responsibility of Joint
Forces Command, previously known as USACOM. 58
Notwithstanding the Mexican and Canadian cases, the lack
of command nullius for Russia leads to, due to TEP
overlapping, five combatant CINCs listing shaping
activities with Russia in their respective TEPs. Not
assigning these three countries to combatant CINCs results 
in inefficiencies and muddled guidance. Moreover, it makes
little sense to have the Joint Staff engaging in this type of
deliberate planning since the staff is removed from its
execution.
TEP: Unfinished Business.
Notwithstanding the important reform of better
aligning the TEP and PPBS processes, additional reforms
should be considered for implementation. These reforms,
that the authors envisage, would greatly improve the
current process and fall under four broad categories:
1. the requirement of the Chairman to reform the Joint
Strategic Planning System the better to effect strategic
plans to establish global and regional priorities for shaping,
2. the need to revise the UCP,
3. the need to develop measures of merit, and
4. the merit of fusing the TEP and the Deliberate
Planning processes.
1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two of the
current authors have argued elsewhere that one of the
weaknesses of the JSPS since the end of the Cold War has
been the reluctance of successive Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to exercise their Title 10 responsibilities and
effect strategic plans.59 This would require the Chairman to
take NCA guidance (the  National Security Strategy and
Contingency Planning Guidance) and establish global
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objectives and priorities to help guide the development of
regional priorities, as well as the development and
operational orientation of the U.S. armed forces. Apropos
the issue of TEP, the Chairman, by establishing key
strategic priorities, could make significant improvements to 
this endeavor in two important areas.
First, strategic priorities would enhance the Chairman’s
Program Recommendation (CPR) for influencing the
development of Service POMs to ensure that they address
the force structure requirements entailed by “shaping.” The
CPR provides the personal views of the CJCS to the
Secretary of Defense concerning key defense planning
issues. These issues are gleaned from a variety of sources
including the work of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC),60 and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities
Assessment (JWCA) 61 teams, CINC input, and JCS
deliberations. Similarly the CJCS provides his personal
evaluation of the adequacy of support afforded the CINCs by 
the Service and Defense Agency POMs in the Chairman’s
Program Assessment (CPA), the content of which is again
informed by a variety of sources.
Second, exercising his authority to effect strategic plans,
the Chairman should also take the Prioritized Planning
Objectives contained in the Contingency Planning
Guidance (CPG) document and derive from them priorities
and guidance for the combatant CINCs. Just as the
Chairman must take the CPG and establish priorities and
guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for
the CINCs to develop operation, contingency and functional
plans, he should do the same as regards guidance for the
development of Theater Engagement Plans. This reform
would provide improved guidance to the CINCs. It also
would force the Joint Staff to think of force assignments for
TEP missions as being more than simply the process used to
assign forces to combatant CINCs, those rotationally
deployed forces to the theater, and temporarily deployed
forces for engagement activities.
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2. Revising the Unified Command Plan. The revision by
the Chairman of the JSCP as outlined above would solve the 
current problem where the CPG’s Prioritized Regional
Objectives are listed by region, vice AOR as established by
the Unified Command Plan. Yet, other nettlesome issues
remain to be addressed regarding the UCP. Most important
is the need for Russia to be addressed in the UCP. To be
sure, how the U.S. armed forces will deal with Russia as
determined in the UCP has repercussions far beyond those
related to TEP. That said, one would think that, at a
minimum, a coherent and effective Russian TEP, which
implies clear lines of responsibility and allocation of
resources, should be a high priority for the NCA and DoD.
The issue of Mexico and Canada need to be addressed
separately, though they share one key commonality.
Defense cooperation with both Mexico and Canada has long
been addressed through special bilateral bodies falling
under the Joint Staff.62 As such, both countries are able to
deal directly with the Joint Staff and by-pass a combatant
CINC: a coveted status. The TEPs for both countries are
developed by the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
of the Joint Staff.
Canada presents a relatively easy case to address. The
Joint Staff through the Canada-U.S. Cooperation
Committee coordinates defense cooperation with Canada
and political guidance is derived from the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense. Whereas cooperation with Mexico is
strictly limited, that with Canada is all-inclusive. 63 Given
the breadth and depth of cooperation that exists between
our two departments of defense and armed forces, it is
rather ridiculous even to consider thinking there is a need
for a “TEP” for Canada, let alone assigning it to U.S. Joint
Forces Command for engagement purposes. Indeed, the
mere existence of such a plan could be politically explosive
in Ottawa: why does the U.S. DoD think it needs to “shape” a 
developed democracy which is also a global ally? One would
think that Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
select NATO allies should not be addressed by a combatant
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CINC within the context of TEP. Such efforts are a waste of
time and effort, let alone politically injudicious. Instead,
combatant CINCs should coordinate their TEP campaign
plans with key allies to ensure that we are not duplicating
their own shaping efforts. 64 Defense activities carried out by
combatant CINCs with allied armed forces should fall under 
the “respond” strategic concept (as they are considered by
Chairman’s exercise program) in the National Security
Strategy where they would more appropriately be planned
and executed.
Bilateral defense cooperation with Mexico is addressed
in the Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission. The
implementation of the TEP for Mexico was muddled in that
both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Joint Forces
Command (formerly U.S. Atlantic Command) 65 had
responsibilities for that country’s TEP implementation.
However, since March 1999, as mentioned above, U.S.
Southern Command has the lead for TEP planning and
implementation. While perhaps outside of the purview of
this particular essay, it seems to make little sense to keep
Mexico in a state of command nullius for deliberate
planning purposes given that U.S. Southern Command now
has the lead to develop the Mexico TEP.
Finally, the Continental United States (CONUS) does
not formally fall under a combatant commander. The closest 
commander that fills that requirement is CINC U.S. Joint
Forces Command. This is an important consideration given
that many “shaping” activities physically take place in
CONUS under the sponsorship of another combatant CINC, 
or use assets assigned to the Service components of CINC
Joint Forces Command (e.g., Partnership for Peace
exercises that take place in CONUS). Given that Joint
Forces Command’s AOR currently consists of the Azores
Islands, Greenland, and Iceland (and Canada for TEP), 66
consideration should be given to directing that the
command concentrate its focus on developing supporting
TEPs for the other CINCs, as opposed to spending its
resources on such a limited TEP program of its own. With 80 
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percent of the U.S. general purpose forces stationed in
CONUS and most of them falling under U.S. Joint Forces
Command, ensuring that the other geographic combatant
commanders’ TEPs have adequate forces and resources
based in CONUS should be that CINC’s priority. 67
3. Assessing TEPs. DoD has determined that the Joint
Staff will “review” TEPs, as opposed to “assess” them. At
present, the TEP review process is incapable of ascertaining 
which specific shaping activities undertaken by a
combatant CINC should be denied to provide resources to
another CINC with greater priority or who can make better
use of the resources. Hence, there is a need to develop a
standard by which shaping activities are judged to be of
value in meeting national objectives. This is not, however, to 
argue for the introduction of a cumbersome quantitatively-
based assessment process that would provide a limited and
rigid means of assessment. To be useful, the assessment
process must be capable of addressing accurately the
intangible, and admittedly subjective, aspects of shaping
activities. For this reason, the authors argue that such a
system needs to be based upon the principle of “merit,” vice
“effectiveness” to inhibit the introduction of
quantitative-based methodology.
The genesis of this problem can be traced to the failure of
DoD planning to establish priorities among regions. As in
the case of the problem of the mismatch of the CPG’s
Prioritized Regional Objectives to the geographic
combatant commander’s AORs, however, this does not
absolve the Chairman from his Title 10 responsibilities to
effect strategic plans. This responsibility includes deriving
from NCA guidance the establishment of global or
inter-regional priorities to direct the operation of the U.S.
armed forces.68 In consequence, the creation of a system of
measures of merit, broadly applicable across all combatant
commands, along with the revision of translating
Prioritized Regional Objectives into prioritized guidance in
the JSCP to the combatant CINCs, would greatly improve
the ability of DoD to ascertain whether planned shaping
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activities are supporting the pursuit of national objectives
and where resources need to be redirected. 69
4. Deliberate Planning and TEP. TEPs are currently
treated similarly to deliberate plans developed by a
combatant CINC. For the numerous reasons cited above,
the current authors argue that TEP are simply not
deliberate plans, and importantly, should not merely be
“reviewed,” but also “assessed” by the Joint Staff. Indeed,
U.S. Code requires that the CJCS should:
Advis[e] the Secretary [of Defense] on critical deficiencies and
strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic,
and mobility support) identified during the preparation and
review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such
deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security
objectives and policy and on strategic plans (emphasis
added).70
In other words, the law is quite clear that there is the
expectation that the CJCS should “assess” all of the
deliberate plans produced by the CINCs, i.e., produce an
analysis of all of the plans collectively to ensure that they
meet the stated intentions and spirit of the administration’s 
policy. This requirement should extend the to TEPs, also. A
“review” alone of individual TEPs does not provide this
additional level of analysis, nor does it meet the
requirements of Title 10, U.S. Code.
Additionally, the early determination to include TEP in
the Deliberate Planning system raises an unintended, yet
important question. What should be the relationship
between a combatant commander’s TEP and his deliberate
planning requirements? In other words, should combatant
CINCs continue to develop separate plans for “shaping” and
“responding” using two discrete systems, where they may
not be mutually supportive, let alone closely coordinated?
It would appear that the developers of the TEP system
placed it in the deliberate planning process without fully
considering these important questions. Either intended or
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not, an intellectual border either exists, or could be allowed
to develop, between shaping and responding that is both
artificial and not particularly useful in implementing the
National Security Strategy. To be sure, the deliberate
planning system served the country well during the Cold
War when threats were clearly discernable, predictable,
and quantifiable. Shaping was undertaken during this
period, however, only as a secondary mission for the U.S.
armed forces to that of preparing for global conflict. To be
rather blunt, given the current international environment,
one needs to consider what is the utility of addressing
shaping and responding through the Deliberate Planning
process separately. 
Given the priorities of the administration and DoD, a
more inclusive and holistic approach to operation planning
and shaping should be considered. This initiative should
begin with the fact the U.S. armed forces spend more time,
resources and effort engaged in “shaping” than they do
“responding.” This is not to argue that preparation for
conflict should be eschewed. Rather, one must recognize
that the current Joint Strategic Planning System produces
separate, and not necessarily coordinated, plans for
“shaping” and “responding.” The authors argue that
combatant command and Joint Staff planners should
approach shaping and responding in the same planning
continuum, vice continuing the current system where
response planning remains reactive and detached from
shaping.
More specifically, JSCP-directed deliberate planning
guidance should outline the outcomes NCA expects from
each planning scenario and how U.S. forces engaged in
shaping can effect positive changes short of war. The
guidance to develop TEPs should address the possibility
that shaping activities might not have the desired effect on
specific countries. In short, operation and contingency plans 
and TEP could be conducted simultaneously and
concomitantly. Under such a revised planning system, the
plans to shape and those to respond would be directly
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connected to allocated forces in a more systematic fashion.
One could envisage (see Figure 1) that a reformed
TEP/deliberate planning system would resemble very
broadly the CJCS’s standing rules of engagement where
planning would transition as threat increased:
1. Peacetime activity (Shape/TEP),
2. Transition from peacetime to crisis (TEP/Deliberate
Planning), and 
3. Transition from crisis to war (Respond/execution of
Operation Plans).
 The implications of such reforms to the Joint Strategic
Planning and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
systems would extend far beyond the current systems used
by the combatant CINCs. However, the benefits from such a
change appear to far  outweigh any disadvantages. By
addressing both missions in the same planning
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Figure 1.
Integrated Shaping/Execution Planning Process.
methodology, the short, mid- and long-term requirements
for shaping and responding would facilitate coordination
between supporting and supported combatant
commanders. This, in turn, would be reflected in the
combatant commanders’  IPL submissions.  This
improvement would enable the Services in their POM
development to program the forces that the combatant
CINCs will require for TEP purposes in the future. A further 
necessary step would be to introduce a cycle of TEP risk
assessments, perhaps as part of the CJCS’s assessment of
TEPs. The purpose of this risk assessment would be to allow
the Chairman to reallocate resources globally to respond to
changes in the international security environment, the
better to exploit shaping opportunities. Thus, the allocation
of forces for shaping activities would not necessarily have to
be limited to the JSCP planning period of 2 years, but could
be made more responsive to the development of
international “opportunities.”
Treating shaping and responding in more equal balance
has great implications for force assignments to the
combatant CINCs for both contingency and shaping
planning requirements. Allocation of forces for shaping
would be directly linked to the Chairman’s establishment of
global and regional priorities in the revised JSCP taskings
to the combatant CINCs. No longer would these
commanders be constrained to develop shaping plans with
only those forces assigned to the command. Rather, the
JSCP would allocate forces to combatant commanders for
shaping and responding, thus ensuring that CINCs have
sufficient forces to carry out their full spectrum of
requirements.
Conclusion.
The Theater Engagement Planning process represents a 
major attempt at reforming a key aspect of the JSPS, with
the aim of aligning better the activities of the Services and
combatant CINCs to national level strategic guidance. A
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successful shaping strategy and TEP process have the
potential of obviating possible future threats to U.S. and
Western security interests, as well as facilitating the ability
of the U.S. armed forces to respond to crises should shaping
fail. DoD is attempting to move away from solely reactive
planning for potential conflict to where it can capture what
the U.S. armed services are already doing in the area of
shaping and then ascertain where there are successes and
deficiencies. Given the difficulty of effecting any type of
reform in an organization the size of DoD, it should not be
surprising that change is often accomplished incrementally.
At present, significant progress has been made in better
aligning the joint planning process to support the
engagement strategy of shaping. Many key reforms need to
be taken, however, before shaping earns its rightful place in
the planning and budgeting processes in DoD. Measures of
merit must be developed, as well as a clarification of Title 10
prerogatives to force the Services to support combatant
commanders with the necessary data to make measures of
merit useful for decision making at the NCA level. The
alignment of the TEP planning process with PPBS signifies
an important advance. However, the Chairman must
continue this reform to its logical conclusion by ensuring
that his Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and
Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) are principally and 
independently influenced by IPLs submitted by the
combatant CINCs. Moreover, the CJCS needs to implement
a more systematic assessment of TEPs to ensure that they
are collectively meeting the objectives of, and are in
conformance with, the guidance given by the NCA. The
Unified Command Plan (UCP) needs to be revised to deal
more effectively with Canada and Russia. And finally, TEP
and the deliberate planning systems need to be merged, the
better to enable combatant CINCs to shape their areas of
responsibility, as well as to be better prepared to transition
to crises and war when required. Albeit perhaps dismissed
by some as a minor issue in defense planning, the continued
reform of the TEP process has the potential to continue the
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reform of DoD the better to enable the United States to
secure the hard won peace that was produced following the
end of the Cold War.
Recommendations.
1. A system of measures of merit needs to be developed to
enable the effective “assessment” of TEPs. The CJCS should 
develop categories and combatant CINCs should be directed 
to demonstrate how they meet their own measures of merit.
This reform will eliminate the current practice of the Joint
Staff merely “reviewing” TEPs, but include an assessment
of them collectively.
2. Title 10 needs to be reexamined to ensure that Service
components must provide the necessary information to
combatant CINCs to enable them to undertake an
assessment of measures of merit. Specifically, component
commands must be prepared to supply budgetary
information for any component temporarily or permanently
assigned to a combatant CINC.
3. Global and regional priorities, guidance, and resource
allocations for shaping should be communicated by the
Chairman in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
4. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) should be revised
in the following manner:
    a. Global allies (e.g., Canada) and select NATO allies do 
not require TEPs. Combatant CINCs should be directed to
coordinate their TEP campaign plans with select allies.
  b. For TEP planning and execution purposes, Russia
should be assigned to U.S. European Command.
    c. U.S. Joint Forces Command should not develop TEPs 
for Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. Rather, it should
focus its attention to becoming the force provider for the
TEPs planned and executed by the other combatant
commanders.
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5. The CINCs’ IPLs should address shaping and form the 
basis for the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR)
and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).
6. The Joint Staff needs to consider combining TEP with
response planning methodologies. A new planning
methodology should be developed that combines TEP and
deliberate planning in a coherent and integrated fashion.
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